The speech excited surprise that Samuel Smith, a man accounted shrewd, should suppose such arguments to be decent, much less convincing. From Federalists, who conscientiously wished submission to British policy, Smith’s reasoning would have seemed natural; but Smith protested against submission, and favored arming merchant-ships and providing them with convoy,--a measure useless except to bring on war in a “side-way.” Congress preferred to choose its own time for fighting, and declined listening to Smith’s advice, although the Senate sustained him in rejecting Macon’s bill. On this occasion Giles appeared, and voted with the Administration; but sixteen senators followed Smith, while only fifteen could be found to act in concert with the House and the Executive. After the Senate had thus put an end to Macon’s bill, the House after much hesitation, March 31, put an end to Smith’s bill. After five months of discussion Congress found itself, April 1, where it had been in the previous November. Rather than resume friendly relations with both belligerents without even expressing a wish for the recovery of national self-respect, the House made one more effort. April 7 Macon reported a new bill, which was naturally nicknamed Macon’s bill No. 2. This measure also seems to have had the assent of the Cabinet, but Macon himself neither framed nor favored it. “I am at a loss to guess what we shall do on the subject of foreign relations,” he wrote to his friend Judge Nicholson, three days later.[146] “The bill in the enclosed paper, called Macon’s No. 2, is not really Macon’s, though he reports it as chairman. It is in truth Taylor’s. This I only mention to you, because when it comes to be debated I shall not act the part of a father, but of a step-father.” The Taylor who took this responsibility was a member from South Carolina, whose career offered no other great distinction than the measure which produced a war with England.