Adams’s surprise was the greater when, with the discovery of this immense obstacle, he discovered also an equally covert influence at work in his favor, and felt that the protection was stronger than the enmity. Before many months had passed, he found himself winning successes that could be explained only by the direct interposition of the Czar against the resistance of Roumanzoff and the ambassador of France. In the mysterious atmosphere of the Russian court, the effect of wielding this astounding power might well have turned his head; but Adams hardly realized his position. At the outset, obliged to ask the Czar’s interference on behalf of the plundered American merchants in Denmark, he could regard himself only as performing an official duty without hope of more than a civil answer. This was in fact the first result of the request; for when, Dec. 26, 1809, he opened the subject to Roumanzoff, the chancellor gave him no encouragement. The Danes, he said, had been forced by France to do what they were doing. France viewed all these American ships as British; and “as this was a measure emanating from the personal disposition of the Emperor of France, he was apprehensive there existed no influence in the world of sufficient efficacy to shake his determination.”[321] Adams resigned himself to this friendly refusal of a request made without instructions, and implying the personal interference of the Czar with the most sensitive part of Napoleon’s system. Three days afterward, December 29, Adams saw Roumanzoff again, who told him, with undisguised astonishment, that he had reported to the Czar the American minister’s request for interference in Denmark and his own refusal; and that the Czar had thought differently, and had “ordered him immediately to represent to the Danish government his wish that the examination might be expedited, and the American property restored as soon as possible; which order he had already executed.”[322]