History of the United States of America, Volume 6 (of 9) : $b During the first administration of James MadisonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 6 (of 9) : $b During the first administration of James Madison
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
The House went at once into secret session; the Message was referred
to the Committee of Foreign Relations; and two days afterward, June
3, Calhoun brought in a report recommending an immediate appeal to
arms. As a history of the causes which led to this result, Calhoun’s
report was admirable, and its clearness of style and statement forced
comparisons not flattering to the President’s Message; but as an
argument for the immediate necessity of war, the report like the
Message contented itself with bare assertions. “The United States must
support their character and station among the nations of the earth, or
submit to the most shameful degradation.” Calhoun’s arguments were
commonly close in logic, and avoided declamation; but in the actual
instance neither he nor his followers seemed confident in the strength
of their reasoning.
After the House had listened in secret session, June 3, to the reading
of this report, Josiah Quincy moved that the debate should be public.
The demand seemed reasonable. That preliminary debates should be
secret might be proper, but that war with any Power, and most of all
with England, should be declared in secret could not be sound policy,
while apart from any question of policy the secrecy contradicted the
professions of the party in power. Perhaps no single act, in a hundred
years of American history, showed less regard for personal and party
consistency than the refusal by the Republicans of 1812 to allow
society either rights or privileges in regard to the declaration of
war upon England. Quite apart from military advantages to be hoped
from secrecy, Henry Clay and his friends were weary of debate and
afraid of defeat. Only a few days before, May 29, Clay forced Randolph
from the floor by tactics which showed that no more discussion was to
be allowed. The secret session gave the Speaker absolute power, and
annihilated opposition. By seventy-six votes to forty-six, the House
rejected Quincy’s motion; and a similar motion by Randolph shared the
same fate.
This demand being refused, the minority declined further discussion.
They said that any act of theirs which admitted the validity of what
they held to be a flagrant abuse of power could do no good, and might
create a dangerous precedent. Henceforward they contented themselves
with voting. On the same day Calhoun presented the bill declaring war
against England, and on the second reading the opposition swelled to
forty-five votes; while of the Republican majority, numbering about
one hundred and five members, only seventy-six could be brought to the
test. June 4 the third reading was carried by a vote of seventy-eight
to forty-five, and the same day the bill passed by a vote of
seventy-nine to forty-nine.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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