History of the United States of America, Volume 6 (of 9) : $b During the first administration of James MadisonAdams, Henry
History
History of the United States of America, Volume 6 (of 9) : $b During the first administration of James Madison
Adams, Henry
United States -- History -- 1801-1809; United States -- History -- 1809-1817
“At the end of the last session,” said Calhoun, December 8, “I
recommended high duties as a substitute for the Non-importation
Act. High duties have no pernicious effects, and are consistent
with the genius of the people and the institutions of the
country. It is thus we would combine in the highest degree
the active resources of the country with the pressure on the
manufactures of the enemy. Your army and navy would feel the
animating effect.... The non-importation as a redress of wrongs
is radically defective. You may meet commercial restrictions
with commercial restrictions, but you cannot safely confront
premeditated insult and injury with commercial restrictions
alone.... It sinks the nation in its own estimation; it
counts for nothing what is ultimately connected with our best
hopes,--the Union of these States. Our Union cannot safely
stand on the cold calculation of interest alone; it is too
weak to withstand political convulsions; we cannot without
hazard neglect that which makes man love to be a member of an
extensive community,--the love of greatness, the consciousness
of strength.”
The three South Carolinians--Calhoun, Cheves, and Lowndes--had a
financial policy of their own, in which they received some private
sympathy, if not much active support, from the Treasury. Gallatin, in
his own way, stood in a position almost as solitary as that of John
Randolph; but condemned as he was to support the burden of a war which
Congress had insisted upon, with only such financial means as Congress
left him, he could feel little sympathy with any financial scheme,
for all were more or less clumsy and inefficient. As far as he could
see, nothing but peace could save the Treasury. In June, at the time
of declaring war, he urged taxation; but the party feared taxation,
and preferred to wait the chances of military success. In December
these expected successes turned into disasters; the country showed
an unforeseen hostility to the war. Taxation might easily be fatal,
for the war found little real support except in Kentucky, Tennessee,
and the Southern States, precisely where internal taxation would
excite deepest resistance. The war leaders would not hear of laying
taxes at such a moment, and they had no great difficulty in carrying
their point. Gallatin himself could afford to wait. The accidental
importations from England after the repeal of the British orders
brought five million dollars into the Treasury,--a sum so much greater
than had been expected, and so ample for meeting the interest on old
and new loans, that Gallatin could not think himself obliged to exhaust
his influence and risk that of his party in order to wring taxes from
a timid Congress. The secretary’s attitude brought upon him a fair and
just rebuke from John Randolph, that he had trifled with the dignity
of the House.[378] Had Gallatin been inclined to retort, he would have
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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