Jackson’s determination to defend Mobile had already deprived him of the use of more than half the regular troops assigned to his military district, who remained inactive at Mobile during the months of December and January. They were commanded by General Winchester, whose record as a military officer was not reassuring. Although Fort Bowyer was known to be untenable against attack by land, Jackson not only retained Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence there, but increased his force until he had three hundred and sixty men in his command,--equal to the average strength of an entire regiment, or half the force of regulars which Jackson commanded at New Orleans. This garrison was only large enough to attract, not to repel, an enemy. The obvious criticism on such a course was afterward made by Armstrong:[581]-- “After the arrival of the British armament the garrison of Fort Bowyer was not only continued but increased, though from its locality wholly unable to aid in any important purpose of the campaign. Nor was this the whole extent of the evil, for by the disposition made of this gallant corps it was not only subjected to present inaction, but ultimately ... to the perils of a siege and the humiliation of a surrender.” Colonel Lawrence had no choice but to capitulate, which he did February 11. He had not even the opportunity to resist, for the British made regular approaches, and could not be prevented from capturing the place without the necessity of assault. Jackson reported to the Secretary of War[582] that this event was one which he “little expected to happen but after the most gallant resistance; that it should have taken place without even a fire from the enemy’s batteries is as astonishing as it is mortifying.” In truth, the military arrangements, not Lawrence’s defence, were responsible for the result; and Jackson had reason to fear that a greater disaster was at hand, for unless General Winchester should promptly evacuate Mobile, the disaster of the River Raisin was likely to be repeated on a larger scale. END OF VOL. II. FOOTNOTES: [1] Proclamation of Admiral Cochrane, April 25, 1814; Niles, vi. 182. [2] Pickering to John Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 404. [3] Pickering to George Logan, July 4, 1813; New England Federalism, p. 391. [4] Thoughts in Answer to a Question respecting the Division of the States; by a Massachusetts Farmer. [5] The Palladium, Feb. 1, 1814. [6] Pickering to Putnam, Feb. 4, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 391. [7] Report of Committee; Niles, vi. 4–8. [8] Federalist, no. 46. [9] Dexter to the Electors of Massachusetts, Feb. 14, 1814; Niles, vi. 9. [10] National Intelligencer, May 5, 1814. [11] Shelby to J. J. Crittenden, April 8, 1814; Life of Crittenden, p. 31. [12] Letter of Jan. 15, 1814; “National Intelligencer,” Jan. 27, 1814. [13] The Palladium, July 15, 1814. [14] The Palladium, July 15, 1814.