History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 1 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 1 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
The British minister watched all these proceedings with interest and
anxiety. It seemed to him, that whilst the restlessness of Russian
intrigue was constantly threatening to educe a state of things in
Central Asia, embarrassing to the British-Indian Government, it became
the British, on their parts, to make a counter-move that would keep
her dangerous ally fairly in check. It had been seen, long before
this, that the experiment of drilling the Persian army was nothing
better than an expensive failure. It had, to some extent, the effect
of excluding other European disciplinarians; but, beyond this, it did
not increase our influence in the Persian dominions, or the security
of our Indian frontier. It was advisable, therefore, to do something
more. Never doubting that the network of Russian intrigue would soon
extend itself beyond the Persian frontier, it appeared to the British
minister expedient that we should anticipate the designs of Russia
in Afghanistan by sending an envoy to Dost Mahomed, and offering
to despatch British officers to Caubul to discipline the Ameer’s
army.[104] It was obvious that a decided movement was becoming every
day more and more necessary. A mere conciliatory course of policy,
dictating offers of quiet intervention, was found of no avail in such
a conjuncture. The British minister offered to use his influence with
Shah Kamran to induce that ruler to abstain from the commission of
those acts which had offended the Shah-in-Shah of Persia, but the offer
had been coldly received. It was evident that the aggressive designs of
Mahomed Shah were largely promoted by the Russian minister, and that no
peaceful mediation would induce the young King to abandon his projects
of Eastern conquest.
In the spring of 1836 the plan of the campaign was laid down, but
it was doubtful whether the Shah possessed the means of immediately
reducing it to practice. An unhappy expedition against the Toorkomans
in the course of the summer somewhat cooled his military ardour; and
before the year had worn to a close, he opened negotiations with Herat.
A gallant answer was sent back to his demands. “You demand hostages,”
said the Heratee minister. “We gave no hostages during the reign of
the late Shah; and we will give none now. You demand a present; we are
ready to give as large a present as we can afford. If the Shah is not
satisfied with this, and is determined to attack us, let him come. We
will defend our city as long as we can; and if we are driven from it,
it will of course remain in your hands till we can find means to take
it back again from you.” The Shah was, at this time, on the way back to
his capital. He at once summoned a council of war, laid the offensive
answer of Yar Mahomed before the chief officers who attended him in
his tent, and sought their advice. The result was a determination to
return to Teheran for the winter months, and to commence the expedition
against Herat early in the following spring.[105]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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