History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 1 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 1 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
The open, acknowledged danger, to be met by vigorous measures on the
part of our Anglo-Indian statesmen, was the attempt of Mahomed Shah
to destroy the integrity of Herat, and his asserted claims to the
sovereignty of Ghuznee and Candahar. It is true that by the ninth
article of the treaty with Persia, England was especially bound not
to interfere in any quarrels between the Afghans and the Persians;
but our statesmen both in the East and the West, saw a ready means of
escape from these conditions in the circumstances of the assault on
Mr. M’Neill’s courier, which, however contemptible in themselves, were
sufficient to bring about a temporary rupture between Persia and Great
Britain. Lord Auckland was slow to encourage an idea of the expediency
of such direct interference as would be involved in the passage of a
British army across the great boundary line of the Indus. But he saw
the necessity of so establishing our influence in Afghanistan as to
erect a secure barrier against invasion from the westward; and now
that he had abandoned all desire to propitiate Dost Mahomed and the
Barukzye chiefs, and had begun to think of carrying out his objects
through other agency, it was only natural that he should have turned
his thoughts, in the first instance, to the Suddozye pensioner of
Loodhianah, who had made so many unsuccessful efforts to reseat himself
upon the throne of the Douranee Empire.
Shah Soojah had lived so long upon the bounty of the British
Government, that it was only reasonable to believe that we should find
in him a fast friend and a faithful ally. But when in the month of
May, 1838, Lord Auckland, then at Simlah, wrote an elaborate minute,
setting forth his opinions regarding the measures best calculated
to secure the integrity of the western frontier of Afghanistan, and
suggesting the restoration of the exiled Suddozye Prince, it was
evident that he had not, at that time, grasped the grand, but perilous
idea, of sending a British army into the fastnesses of Afghanistan
to break down the dynasty of the Barukzyes, to set up a monarch of
our own, and so to roll back for ever the tide of western invasion.
He meditated nothing more at this time than the encouragement of an
expedition to be undertaken by Shah Soojah and Runjeet Singh, the
British Government supplying money, appointing an accredited agent to
accompany the Shah’s camp, and furnishing a certain number of British
officers to direct the movements of the Shah’s army.[217] It appeared
to him that there were but three courses open to him; “the first to
confine our defensive measures to the line of the Indus, and to leave
Afghanistan to its fate; the second, to attempt to save Afghanistan,
by granting succour to the existing chiefships of Caubul and Candahar;
the third, to permit or to encourage the advance of Runjeet Singh’s
armies upon Caubul, under counsel and restriction, and as subsidiary
to his advance to organise an expedition headed by Shah Soojah, such
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