History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 2 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 2 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
Such, dimly traced in its social aspects, was the general condition of
things at Caubul in this month of September, 1841. Politically—such
was Macnaghten’s conviction—everything was quiet from Dan to
Beersheba. The noses of the Douranee Khans had, he said, “been brought
to the grindstone;” and the Gooroo and other Ghilzye chiefs were in
his safe keeping at Caubul, seemingly contented with their lot. As the
month advanced the Envoy continued to write that our prospects were
“brightening in every direction,” that everything was “_couleur de
rose_.” It is true that Eldred Pottinger, who after a brief visit to
the British provinces had returned to Afghanistan, was not sending in
very favourable reports from the Kohistan and the Nijrow country, which
were now his new sphere of action; but of these troubles Macnaghten
made light account. He believed that Pottinger was an alarmist. It
is true, also, that an expedition was going out to Zao, to reduce
some turbulent robber tribes; but this necessity he attributed to
the indiscretion of one of our own officers, who had needlessly
attacked the place with insufficient means, and been compelled to
beat a retreat.[79] The expedition, too, as Macnaghten said, was only
a “little go;” and immensely popular with our officers, who were
zealously volunteering for the sport, as though it had been a battu or
a steeple-chase.[80]
The popular expedition into the Zoormut country was completely
successful. Macgregor, who accompanied the force in the character of
political adviser, found the rebellious forts evacuated. He had only,
therefore, to destroy them. The results, however, of the movement
were not wholly pacificatory. Pottinger said that the feeling which
it engendered in the Kohistan was extremely unfavourable to us. It
confirmed, he said, in the minds of the malcontents, “the belief so
industriously spread of our difficulties, whilst rumours from Herat and
Candahar of invasion, renewed rebellion, and disturbances, were again
spread abroad.”[81]
During the early part of October the Kohistanees remained perfectly
quiet. But every hour, said Pottinger, “brought rumours of the
formation of an extensive conspiracy.” These he at first doubted;
but he reported them to the Envoy, and asked for information on the
subject. The answer was, that neither Macnaghten nor Burnes could
perceive any grounds for suspicion.
In the mean while, the Eastern Ghilzyes were breaking out into
revolt.[82] They had the same cause of complaint as the Kohistanees.
The money-bag, which had kept them in order, was beginning to fail. It
is a moot point whether revenge or avarice is the stronger feeling in
the Afghan breast. Both were now arrayed against us. The bayonet and
the money-bag were failing to do their work.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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