History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 2 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 2 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
It is the common opinion of all competent authorities that a prompt
and vigorous movement, on the morning of the 2nd of November, would
have strangled the insurrection at its birth. The Afghans freely
admitted this. A Populzye chief who was present at the meeting at
Sydat Khan’s house on the night of the 1st of November, told Major
Rawlinson that not one of the chiefs, who then leagued themselves
together, ventured to stir from his house until the afternoon of
the following day. They expected that the first onset—the attack
on the houses of Burnes and Johnson—would be successful; but they
were under an equally strong conviction that the violence would be
promptly avenged by the troops from cantonments, and they therefore
refrained from committing themselves by taking any personal part in
the _émeute_. It seems to have been the impression of the majority
that such an outbreak at the capital would operate as a warning which
the British in Afghanistan would hardly neglect, and that we should
be glad, therefore, to withdraw our forces in the spring and leave
the Douranees to their own devices.[109] “Not only I, but several
other officers,” says Captain Johnson, “have spoken to Afghans on the
subject; there has never been one dissenting voice, that had a small
party gone into the town prior to the plunder of my treasury and the
murder of Burnes, the insurrection would have been instantly quashed.
This was also the opinion of Captain Trevor, at that time living
in the town.”[110] Captain Mackenzie has given an equally emphatic
opinion to the same effect. “During our expedition into Kohistan,
under General MacCaskill,” he writes, “I accompanied it, having been
placed by General Pollock in charge of Shah-zadah Shapoor and the
Kuzzilbash camp. In my frequent communications with Khan Shereen
Khan, some of the late leaders, and other chiefs of the Kuzzilbash
faction, all the circumstances of the late insurrection were over and
over again recapitulated, one and all declaring positively that the
slightest exhibition of energy on our part, in the first instance,
more especially in reinforcing my post and that of Trevor, would at
once have decided the Kuzzilbashes, and all over whom they possessed
any influence, in our favour. Khan Shereen Khan also confirmed the
idea that an offensive movement on the opposite side of the town by
Brigadier Shelton, had it been made in the early part of the fatal 2nd
of November, would at once have crushed the insurrection.”[111] Mohun
Lal says, that in the first instance no more than thirty men were sent
to surround Sir Alexander Burnes’s house, and that the rest were drawn
thither subsequently by the hope of plunder.[112] Captain Johnson,
already quoted, adds, “The mob at the first outbreak did not exceed 100
men. They however speedily increased; the plunder of my treasury, my
private property and that of Sir Alexander—seeing that no steps were
taken to save either the one or the other, nor even what was of more
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account