History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
of March, when England sought to justify his failure by a reference to
the reinforcements from Candahar.
Only one more point remains to be mentioned in connexion with a subject
which the chronicler of these events is but too anxious to dismiss.
General England insinuated that he had no reliance upon his Sepoy
troops. He is said to have remarked, that although when his troops and
those of General Nott were united they would have 15,000 men under
their command, they could not oppose a whole nation with two weak
regiments.[144] He thought that her Majesty’s two regiments, the 40th
and 41st, were the only two corps that could be relied upon. Nott told
a different story. “My Sepoys are behaving nobly,” was his constant
report. I can find no mention of any backwardness on the part of the
Sepoys, in any of the letters written by the officers of either service
after the affair at Hykulzye; and I believe, that if Colonel Stacy
had been suffered to storm the works after the first repulse, a large
number of Sepoys would have volunteered to follow him.
When all the circumstances of the case come to be considered, it
appears that a disaster of a very discouraging character was sustained
by the adoption of a course which had no object of importance
commensurate with the risk that was incurred. General England had no
intention of advancing upon Candahar. He ought, therefore, to have
remained at Quettah. The advance into the Pisheen valley was a grave
error. It was plainly England’s duty, at this time, either to have
cleared the pass with the treasure and stores which were so much
needed by the Candahar garrison, or to have waited patiently for his
reinforcements at Quettah. To advance from that place, and then to fall
back upon it, was to do that which Nott said, in anticipation, would
be more injurious to the position of the Candahar force than 20,000 of
the enemy in the field.[145] Major Outram also strongly advised General
England to await at Quettah the arrival of the reinforcements from
below; but England would go on to be beaten.[146]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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