History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
The interpretation, however, was not easy. Very different opinions
obtained among the leading officers in the British camp respecting
the amount of punishment which it now became the British General to
inflict upon the Afghan capital. It was a moot question, involving many
considerations, and not to be hastily solved; but there could have been
no question whether, at that time, justice and expediency did not alike
require that the inhabitants of Caubul and the neighbourhood should
be protected against unauthorised acts of depredation and violence.
Against the plunderings of soldiers and camp-followers Pollock had
steadfastly set his face; but in the neighbourhood of Nott’s camp
much was done to destroy the confidence which Pollock was anxious to
re-establish, and to alarm and irritate the chiefs whom he desired to
conciliate.[318] After a few days the new minister and Khan Shereen
Khan, the chief of the Kuzzilbashes, determined to represent to
Pollock, in a joint letter, the grievances of which they thought they
were entitled to complain.[319]
The minister had been anxious to pay his respects to the gallant
commander of the Candahar division, and had waited upon him with a
letter from Macgregor; but Nott had peremptorily refused to give him
an audience. He believed it to be the desire of Lord Ellenborough that
no Afghan Government should be recognised by the British authorities,
and he was unwilling to favour any such recognition by receiving visits
of ceremony from the functionaries appointed by the government which
had been established at Caubul. As Pollock had not been equally nice
upon this point, the refusal of his brother-general to extend his
courtesies to the minister could only have embarrassed our supreme
authorities at Caubul, and attached suspicion to the sincerity of our
proceedings. But Nott, at this time, was in no mood of mind to extend
his courtesies either to Afghan or to British authorities. It was his
belief that even then the British army ought to have been on its way
to Jellalabad. He had with him a sufficiency of supplies to carry him
to the latter place; and was irritated at the thought that Pollock had
come up to Caubul without provisions to carry him back.[320] If he had
been in supreme authority at Caubul, he would have destroyed the Balla
Hissar and the city, and would have marched on with the least possible
delay to Jellalabad. He placed his sentiments on record regarding the
impolicy of the halt at Caubul—declared that he would be compelled
to make military requisitions to rescue his troops from starvation;
and denounced Futteh Jung and the new ministers as the enemies of the
British. Nothing, indeed, could dissuade Nott that every Afghan in the
country was not our bitter foe.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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