History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
Writing again, on the 13th of February, he says: “In regard to the
means of inducing zealous co-operation on the part of the Sikh troops,
I do not think that the expectations of Captains Mackeson and Lawrence
are quite reasonable, or the almost indefinite extent of proposed
reward judicious, or the direct negotiation with the Jummoo Rajahs
for their immediate aggrandisement honourable.... It would not be
compatible with the friendship long subsisting between the British
Government and the Lahore Government, now to assign suddenly and
directly to the Jummoo Rajahs any territories as a compensation for
services demanded of the Sikh Durbar. This would be precipitating the
decline of a power which it may be soon expedient to prop, both against
Afghans and Jummooees.”—[_MS. Records._] But though Mr. Clerk thought,
at this time, that it would not be honourable openly to treat with the
Jummoo Rajahs for the transfer of Jellalabad, he was not unwilling to
place it permanently in their hands by a stroke of _finesse_. I confess
that I cannot see very distinctly how the course suggested by Mr. Clerk
is so much more “honourable,” and “compatible with friendship,” than
that suggested by Captains Mackeson and Lawrence.
POLLOCK’S APPEAL TO HIS ARMY.
[_Book VII., chapter 4, page 84._]
After alluding to the defence of Jellalabad, and the probability that
the Peshawur force would immediately advance to its relief, General
Pollock said: “Success in relieving these troops will raise for this
force the admiration and gratitude of all India, and the Major-General
commanding feels assured that officers and men will cheerfully make
any sacrifices to attain so noble an object. He therefore now calls
upon the Brigadiers to assemble the commanding officers under their
orders, and determine on the least quantity of baggage and the smallest
number of camp-followers with which their regiments can advance. The
success of this enterprise will greatly depend upon the quantity of
baggage taken, as from the nature of the country between Peshawur and
Jellalabad, the line most consistent with safety must be as little
incumbered as possible. The Major-General commanding trusts that the
confidence he feels in the troops will be repaid by their confidence
in him. The soldiers may rest assured that his thoughts are constantly
engaged in ensuring their provisions and securing their comforts, and
they may be convinced they will never be called upon by him to make
useless sacrifices, or to undergo unnecessary hardships. Arrangements
will be made for placing such baggage as may be left behind in perfect
security at Peshawur.”
FORCING THE KHYBUR.—POLLOCK’S GENERAL ORDERS.
[_Book VII., chapter 4, pages 87, 88._]
[The following are the rules laid down for the guidance of commanding
officers, to which allusion is made in the text.]
* * * * *
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