History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third EditionKaye, John William, Sir
History
History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 3 (of 3): Third Edition
Kaye, John William, Sir
Afghan Wars
Reason and experience were both on the side of this argument, and
Rawlinson stated the case clearly and well. But Nott took a soldier’s
view of the question. He argued, that to send out a brigade at such
a season of the year, so far from its supports, would be to destroy
his men in the field, and to expose the city to the attacks of the
enemy. “I conceive,” he wrote in reply to Rawlinson’s letter, “that
the whole country is in a state of rebellion, and that nothing but
the speedy concentration of the troops at this place has saved the
different detachments from being destroyed in detail, and the city of
Candahar from being besieged.... Because this young Prince is said to
have assembled 1000 or 1500 followers at a distance of forty miles from
Candahar, it would, indeed, be truly absurd were I, in the very depth
of winter, to send a detachment wandering about the country in search
of the rebel fugitive, destroying my men amidst frost and snow, killing
the few carriage-cattle we have left, and thus be totally disabled at
the proper season from moving ten miles in any direction from the city,
or even have the means of falling back, should that unfortunately ever
become necessary.”[95]
The movements of the rebel army soon settled the question between
them. No attempt having been made to dislodge the insurgent chiefs,
they quietly moved down the valley of the Urghundab, and on the 12th
of January took post on the river, about five miles to the west of the
city of Candahar.
General Nott lost no time in moving out to attack them. Taking with
him five and a half regiments of infantry, the Shah’s 1st Cavalry, a
party of Skinner’s Horse, and sixteen guns,[96] a formidable body of
troops, weak only in the mounted branch—he made a four hours’ march
over a few miles of country, and came upon the enemy,[97] posted
near the fortified village of Killa-chuk, on the right bank of the
Urghundab. The British troops crossed the river, and at once advanced
in column of battalions, flanked by the artillery and cavalry, to the
attack. The action was of brief duration. At the end of twenty minutes,
during which our guns and musketry, telling with deadly effect upon
the heavy masses of the enemy, were answered by a wild and ineffective
fire from their ranks, the rebel army was in confusion and flight. The
Ghilzyes fled in one direction; the Janbaz in another; the people from
the villages[98] hastened to their own homes. Atta Mahomed attempted
to make a stand; but our troops moved forward—carried the village by
storm—and slaughtered every man, woman, and child, within its walls.
The British line was then reformed, and Atta Mahomed prepared to meet
a second attack. But the cavalry, with two horse-artillery guns, were
now slipped upon the enemy, who broke and fled in dismay; and the
humiliation of Atta Mahomed and his princely ally was complete.[99]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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