History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4): Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's GovernmentGreat Britain. War Office
History
History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4): Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's Government
Great Britain. War Office
South African War, 1899-1902
The consideration of these reports and representations made it evident
that the whole situation had changed from that contemplated when the
original plan of campaign had been drawn up. For an aggressive advance
on Bloemfontein there was as yet no adequate army. The component parts
of it were on the high seas. Even after they should have arrived, much
time and labour would be required, before they could be welded
together, and supplied with all that was needed for an offensive march
into a country so distant from the coast. On the other hand, if
Ladysmith should meanwhile fall, the Boer commandos at present
surrounding that town would be set free to seize not only Maritzburg
but probably also the seaport of Durban, the possession of which would
give to the republics direct access to the outer world, and would, as
was believed by both Boer and British, be a signal to all the
disaffected in Cape Colony to take up arms. In the western theatre of
war, the early relief of Kimberley was an object dear to the hearts of
all loyalists, and its loss would undoubtedly give an immediate
impetus to the wave of rebellion. The necessity for immediate action
was urgent, both in Natal and Cape Colony, but the former appeared for
the moment to present the more critical situation. Sir Redvers,
therefore, on the 2nd November, telegraphed to the War Office:
"I consider that I must reinforce Natal, hang on to Orange River
bridge, and give myself to organise troops expected from England.
I am, therefore, withdrawing the garrisons at Naauwpoort and
Stormberg. I shall send Gatacre's division on arrival to Natal,
and with Methuen's and Clery's try to keep the main line open,
and to relieve Kimberley. I do not wish to be pessimistic, but it
seems to me I shall have to wait until March to commence active
operations."
[Sidenote: Messages from and to home. "Extreme gravity."]
On receipt of this report Lord Lansdowne telegraphed an enquiry
whether the division sent to Natal should be replaced by a fresh
division from England. On the 3rd November, in consequence of further
reports from Natal, Sir Redvers telegraphed to the Secretary of State:
"Telegraphic connection with Ladysmith was interrupted yesterday,
and White's force is isolated. He is well supplied with
everything, except ammunition for his naval 12-pounders, which
are the only guns that can compete with hostile artillery. I
regard the situation as one of extreme gravity. Colenso bridge
and Maritzburg are held by one battalion each; we are protecting
Durban from the fleet. I shall despatch the first reinforcements
I receive to Durban, but I cannot conceal from myself that if the
enemy previously occupy, even with a small force, the country
south of Mooi River, the relief of White by troops just landed
will be an almost impossible operation, unless he can hold out
six weeks at least from now."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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