History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4): Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's GovernmentGreat Britain. War Office
History
History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4): Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's Government
Great Britain. War Office
South African War, 1899-1902
Captain Forestier-Walker, who was now in action with the section of
the 18th battery near the farm which had been carried earlier in the
day by the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, vigorously shelled the
trees and brushwood in front of our men as they advanced, but his
efforts were much hampered by the fact that the undergrowth was so
thick that it was impossible to see exactly how far forward they were.
All attempts to establish communication by signal, between the officer
commanding the 9th brigade and the troops on the south side of the
river, failed. The attack broke down from want of strength to drive it
home, and the baffled troops sullenly fell back to Rosmead. They were
so closely pressed by the enemy's musketry that, in order to cover the
retreat, two officers, Major H. F. Coleridge, North Lancashire, and
Captain T. Irvine, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, each with ten or
eleven men of different battalions, threw themselves into farmhouses,
which they stubbornly defended until, many hours later, after their
detachments had suffered severe loss, they were ordered to evacuate
their posts. On his return to the village Major-General Pole-Carew
found that the British strength on the north bank had been increased
by the arrival of 300 officers and men of the Royal engineers, and of
part of a company of the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream Guards. After
writing to Lord Methuen to report his failure to force his way up the
right bank, and to ask for co-operation in the fresh attempt for which
he was then rallying his troops, Pole-Carew heard a rumour that Lord
Methuen had been wounded, and that Major-General Colvile was now in
command of the division. The rumour was true. Lord Methuen had been
wounded at about 4 p.m. near the centre of the line, and one of his
staff officers, Colonel H. P. Northcott, had previously fallen
mortally wounded, while conveying orders for the reinforcement of the
troops on the north bank. Not long after this news came in, the
officer commanding the two guns of the 18th battery, still in action
near the farm to the south of Rosmead, reported that he heard through
the officer commanding the artillery that Major-General Colvile had
issued orders for a vigorous bombardment of the position by the
artillery till dusk, when the Guards were to attack the left of the
Boer line with the bayonet. Pole-Carew then considered whether, in
view of the projected movement of the Guards' brigade, his local
attack was still feasible. He decided that, owing to the configuration
of the ground over which both bodies of troops would have to move in
the darkness, the danger was so great lest his detachment should
enfilade the Guards as to prohibit an advance from Rosmead. All,
therefore, that could be done was to secure firmly that village.
[Sidenote: 62nd battery with four guns arrives after forced march.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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