History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4): Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's GovernmentGreat Britain. War Office
History
History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 v. 1 (of 4): Compiled by Direction of His Majesty's Government
Great Britain. War Office
South African War, 1899-1902
On the 26th November Sir R. Buller had telegraphed to Sir F.
Forestier-Walker: "French should attack Arundel as soon as he feels
strong enough, but not before, and he should be sure that he is strong
enough. We can now afford to wait;" and on the following day he added:
"Tell French to maintain an active defence, not running any risk." On
the 30th another despatch from the General Commanding-in-Chief to
General Forestier-Walker ran: "suggest to French that a policy of
worry, without risking men, might have a good effect on the enemy at
Colesberg and keep him occupied." Meanwhile the constant appearance of
patrols from Naauwpoort had not only completely chained to the
vicinity of Colesberg the main body of the enemy, but had made him
nervous for the safety of his advance party on the kopjes north of
Arundel station; and on the 29th November a squadron of the 12th
Lancers discovered that those kopjes had been evacuated. On this, two
days later, two squadrons of that regiment were sent forward to
Arundel station to bivouac there that night with a view to a
reconnaissance being pushed on to Colesberg on the following morning.
But at 10 p.m. the Lieutenant-General received a telegram from the
Chief of the Staff ordering the 12th Lancers to join Lord Methuen on
the Modder river. The squadrons were, therefore, recalled from Arundel
and the regiment entrained for the Modder on the following day, as
soon as sufficient rolling-stock could be obtained. Its departure left
French for the moment with insufficient mounted men to keep touch with
the enemy, but the arrival of the New Zealanders on the 2nd December
enabled active operations to be renewed, and on the 5th the
Carabiniers, commanded by Colonel T. C. Porter, increased the
Naauwpoort force sufficiently to warrant the adoption of the "policy
of worry" suggested by Sir R. Buller. Moreover, arrangements had now
been completed for the protection of the railway line from Cradock to
Rosmead by part of the Port Elizabeth Volunteer Corps. The details of
the Suffolk regiment and M.I., which had been guarding these
localities, were thereupon recalled to Naauwpoort and rejoined on the
afternoon of 5th December. On the 6th orders were issued for the
occupation on the following day of a position near Arundel with
mounted troops "with the object of pushing forward detachments to
observe the enemy, and clear up the situation near Colesberg next
day." In pursuance of these orders the New Zealand Mounted Rifles
moved out to the ridge to the south of Arundel early on the morning of
the 7th, and later in the day the Carabiniers, mounted infantry (less
a detachment holding Hanover Road station), the N.S.W. Lancers, a
detachment of the R.E. company, and Field Telegraph section were
brought out by train from Naauwpoort under the command of Colonel
Porter; and, having detrained at Hartebeestfontein farm, covered by
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, advanced with that regiment to Arundel
without meeting any opposition.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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