History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Thus it is certain, that difficulties of the most serious nature
awaited the English army while acting on a single line of
operations; and the double line proposed by sir Arthur was strictly
scientific. For if sir John Moore, disembarking at the Mondego,
had marched first to Santarem and then to Saccavem, he would have
turned the positions of Torres Vedras and Montechique, and then sir
Arthur on the other side would have turned the heights of Bellas
by the road of Quelus. Junot’s central situation could not in this
case have availed him, because the distance between the British
corps would be more than a day’s march, and their near approach
to Lisbon would have caused an insurrection of the populace. The
duke of Abrantes must either have abandoned that capital and fallen
vigorously upon sir John Moore, with a view to overwhelm him and
gain Almeida or Elvas, or he must have concentrated his forces,
and been prepared to cross the Tagus if he lost a battle in front
of Lisbon. In the first case, the strength of the country afforded
Moore every facility for a successful resistance, and sir Arthur’s
corps would have quickly arrived upon the rear of the French. In
the second case, Junot would have had to fight superior numbers,
with an inveterate populace in his rear, and if, fearing the result
of such an encounter he had crossed the Tagus, and pushed for
Elvas, sir John Moore’s division could likewise have crossed the
river, and harassed the French in their retreat.
[Sidenote: Captain Poulteney Malcolm’s Evidence. Court of Inquiry.]
2º. The above reasoning being correct, it follows, that to
re-embark sir John Moore’s army after it had landed at the Mondego,
and to bring it down to Maceira bay, was an error which (no
convention intervening) might have proved fatal to the success
of the campaign. This error was rendered more important by the
danger incurred from the passage; for, as the transports were not
sea-worthy, the greatest part would have perished had a gale of
wind come on from the south-west.
[Illustration: _Explanatory Sketch_ of the CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL in
August 1808.
_London. Published March 1828, by John Murray, Albermarle Street._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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