History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Correspondence. MS.]
The leading Spaniards wished to obtain a medium through which to
create a false impression of the state of affairs, and thus to
secure supplies and succours from England without being fettered
in the application of them. The subordinate agents answered this
purpose, and satisfied with their docility, the generals were far
from encouraging the residence of more than one British agent
at their head-quarters. Captain Birch, an intelligent engineer
officer, writing from Blake’s camp, says, “General Broderick is
expected here; but I have understood that the appearance of a
British general at these head-quarters to accompany the army might
give jealousy. General Blake is not communicative, but captain
Carrol appears to be on the best footing with him and his officers,
and captain Carrol tells me that he informs him of more than he
does any of his generals.”
The object was perfectly accomplished; nothing could be more
widely different than Spanish affairs, judged of by the tenor of
the military agent’s reports, and Spanish affairs when brought
to the test of battle. The fault did not attach so much to the
agents as to the ministers who selected them. It was difficult for
inexperienced men to avoid the snare. Living with the chiefs of
armies actually in the field, being in habits of daily intercourse
with them, holding rank in the same service, and dependent upon
their politeness for every convenience, the agent was in a manner
forced to see as the general saw, and to report as he wished. A
simple spy would have been far more efficacious!
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS.]
Sir John Moore, perceiving the evil tendency of such a system,
recalled all those officers who were under his immediate control,
and strongly recommended to ministers that only one channel of
communication should exist between the Spanish authorities and the
British army. He was convinced of the necessity of this measure,
by observing, that each of the military agents considered the
events passing under his own peculiar cognizance as the only
occurrences of importance. Some of those officers even treated sir
Hew Dalrymple and himself as persons commanding auxiliary bodies of
men which might be moved, divided, and applied at the requisition
of every inferior agent, and the forces of the British empire, a
mere accessory aid, placed at their own disposal. Thus general
Leith says: “Whatever may be the plan of operations, and whatever
the result, I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to recommend
to your consideration the great advantage of ordering all the
disposable force of horse or car artillery, and light infantry,
mounted on horses or mules of the country, without a moment’s delay
to move on Palencia, where the column or columns will receive
such intelligence as may enable them to give the most effectual
co-operation.”
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