History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The feeble and dilatory operations of the armies, were partly
owing to the ineptitude of the generals; but the principal causes
were the unbounded vanity, arrogance, and selfishness of the local
governments, among whom the juntas of Gallicia and Seville were
remarkable for their ambition. The time which should have been
passed in concerting measures for pushing the victory of Baylen was
spent by them in devising schemes to ensure the permanency of their
own power, and the money and resources, both of England and Spain,
were applied to further this pernicious object. In every part of
the country a spirit of interested violence prevailed; the ardour
of patriotism was chilled, and the exertions of sensible men were
rendered nugatory, or served as a signal for their own destruction.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 6.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 4.]
The argument to be drawn from this state of affairs is conclusive
against the policy of Joseph’s retreat. Without drafting a man
from the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tortosa, and St. Sebastian;
without interfering with the moveable columns employed on
the communications of Biscay and Navarre; that monarch drew
together about fifty thousand good troops, in twenty days after
he had abandoned his capital. At the head of such a force, or
even of two-thirds of it, he might have bid defiance to the
inactive, half-organized, and scattered Spanish armies. It was
so necessary to have maintained himself in Madrid, that scarcely
any disproportion of numbers should have induced him to abandon
it without an effort; but the disaster of Dupont had created
in Joseph’s mind a respect for Spanish prowess, while from his
sagacious brother it drew the following observation: “_The whole of
the Spanish forces are not capable of beating twenty-five thousand
French in a reasonable position._” The error of abandoning the
capital would, if the Spaniards had been capable of pursuing any
general plan of action, been fatal; but as if the stone of Cadmus
had been cast among them, the juntas turned upon one another in
hate, and forgot the common enemy.
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