Joseph’s errors did not escape the animadversion of his brother, whose sagacity enabled him, although at a distance, to detect, through the glare of the insurrection, all the inefficiency of the Spaniards; but, despising them as soldiers, he dreaded the moral effect produced by their momentary success, and he was preparing to crush the rising hopes of his enemies. Joseph’s retreat, and subsequent position, therefore, displeased him; and he desired his brother to check the exultation of the patriots, by acting upon a bold and well-considered plan, of which he sent him the outline. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 5.] His notes, dictated upon the occasion, are replete with genius, and evince his absolute mastery of the art of war. “It was too late,” he said, “to discuss the question, whether Madrid should have been retained or abandoned? Idle to consider, if a position, covering the siege of Zaragoza, might not have been formed; useless to examine, if the line of the Douro was not better than that of the Ebro for the French army. The line of the Ebro was actually taken, and it must be kept; to advance from that river without a fixed object would create indecision; this would bring the troops back again, and produce an injurious moral effect; but why abandon Tudela? Why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note, and of reputation; the possession of them gave a moral influence, and moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies. Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna and Madrid. It commanded the canal of Zaragoza. It was the capital of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, their first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to Tudela, the land carriage was three days, but the water carriage was only fourteen hours; wherefore to have the besieging artillery and stores at Tudela was the same as to have them at Zaragoza. If the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be in a state of insurrection, and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was of vast importance; but Milagro was of none. It was an obscure place, without a bridge, and commanding no communication; in short, it was without interest, defended nothing! led to nothing! A river,” said this great commander, “though it should be as large as the Vistula, and as rapid as the Danube at its mouth, is nothing, unless there are good points of passage, and a head quick to take the offensive. The Ebro as a defence was less than nothing, a mere line of demarcation! and Milagro was useless. The enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and from thence gain Tolosa, before any preparation could be made to receive him; he might come from Soria, from Logroña, or from Zaragoza. Again, Burgos was the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army.