History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 1
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The want of transport and supplies obliged the British to march
in small and successive divisions. It was, therefore, the 23d of
November before the centre, consisting of twelve thousand infantry,
and a battery of six guns, were concentrated at Salamanca. On that
day Castaños and Palafox were defeated at Tudela, their armies
scattered without a chance of rallying again in the field, and the
third and sixth French corps became disposable.
[Sidenote: Sir John Moore’s Papers.]
The emperor, victorious on both flanks, and with a fresh base of
operations fixed at Burgos, was free to move, with the guards
and the reserve, either against Madrid or in the direction of
Salamanca; and detachments of his army were already in possession
of Valladolid; the very town which, a few days before, the
Spanish government had indicated for the base of sir John Moore’s
operations, and the formation of his magazines.
The 26th the head of sir David Baird’s column was in Astorga, but
the rear extended beyond Lugo. The head of general Hope’s division
was at the Escurial, the rear at Talavera. The second French corps
was on the Deba, threatening Leon and the Asturias; the cavalry
covered the plains; the fourth corps was descending by Carrion and
Valladolid, to seize the pass of the Guadarama; and the emperor
himself was preparing to force the Somosierra.
From this summary of contemporary events, it is evident, that
notwithstanding sir John Moore had organised, equipped, supplied,
and carried his troops four hundred miles in the space of six
weeks, he was too late in the field. The campaign was decided
against the Spaniards before the British had, strictly speaking,
entered Spain as an army; it is also certain, that if, instead of
being at Salamanca, Escurial, and Astorga, on the 23d, the troops
had been united at Burgos on the 8th, such was the weakness of
the Spanish forces, the strength of the enemy, and such the skill
with which Napoleon directed his movements, that a difficult and
precarious retreat was the utmost favour that could be expected
from Fortune by the English general.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, sect. 1 and 4.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account