Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere on the 27th of November, and the arrangements for the execution of his project were all prepared. Baird was to march by Benevente on the 1st, Hope was to move on Tordesillas, and the force at Salamanca was to advance to Zamora and Toro; but in the night of the 28th, a despatch from Mr. Stuart made known the disaster at Tudela. This changed the aspect of affairs; the question proposed to Mr. Frere was no longer doubtful; the projected movement had been founded upon _the chance of rallying the Spanish armies behind the Tagus_; a hazardous and daring experiment when first conceived; but now that Castaños had no longer an army, now that the strength of Spain was utterly broken, to have persisted in it would have been insanity. The French could be over the Tagus before the British, and there were no Spanish armies to rally. The defeat at Tudela took place the 23d of November; Baird’s brigades could not be united at Astorga before the 5th of December, and to concentrate the whole of the army at Salamanca required a flank march of several days over an open plain; an operation not to be thought of, within a few marches of a skilful enemy who possessed such an overwhelming force of artillery and cavalry. As long as Castaños and Palafox kept the field there was reason to believe that the French stationed at Burgos would not make any serious attempt on the side of Astorga, but that check being now removed, an unmilitary flank march would naturally draw their attention, and bring them down upon the parcelled divisions of the English troops. The object of succouring the Spaniards called for great but not for useless sacrifices. The English general was prepared to confront any danger and to execute any enterprise which held out a chance of utility, but he also remembered that the best blood of England was committed to his charge, that not an English army, but the very heart, the pith of the military power of his country was in his keeping, it was entrusted to his prudence, and his patriotism spurned the idea of seeking personal renown by betraying that sacred trust. The political reasons in favour of marching towards Madrid, scarcely balanced the military objections before the battle of Tudela; but after that event, the latter acquiring double force, left no room for hesitation in the mind of any man capable of reasoning at all; and sir John Moore resolved to fall back into Portugal. He ordered sir David Baird to regain Coruña or Vigo, and to carry his troops by sea to Lisbon; but wishing, if possible, to unite with Hope before the retrograde movement commenced, he directed Baird to show a bold front for a few days in order to attract the enemy’s attention. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 13, section 5.]