The English infantry occupied Sahagun, and head-quarters were established there. Romana remained at Mancilla, and it was evident that no assistance could be expected from him; the truth was, that ashamed of exposing the weakness and misery of his troops, he kept away, for, after all his promises, he could not produce six thousand fighting men; his letters, however, were, as usual, extremely encouraging. _The French force in Spain was exceedingly weak, Palafox had not been defeated at Tudela, Soult, including Sonnet’s division, had scarcely nine thousand men of all arms. It was an object to surround and destroy him before he could be succoured_--and other follies of this nature. [Sidenote: S. Journal of Operations, MS.] The English troops having outmarched their supplies, halted the 22d and 23d. Soult, whose intention was to act on the defensive, hastened the march of the reinforcements from the side of Burgos, and being fearful for his communication with Placentia, abandoned Saldaña on the 23d, and concentrated his infantry at Carrion. Debelle’s cavalry again advanced to Villatilla and Villacuenda, Franceschi remained at Riberos, the dragoons of general Lorge occupied Paredes, and general Dumas pushed on the divisions of the eighth corps, of which, Laborde’s was already arrived at Palencia, and Loison’s and Heudelet’s followed at the distance of two days’ march; but these last were very weak. Sir John Moore’s plan was to move during the night of the 23d, so as to arrive at Carrion by daylight on the 24th, to force the bridge, and afterwards ascending the river, fall upon the main body of the enemy, which his information led him to believe was still at Saldaña. This attack was however but a secondary object, his attention was constantly directed towards Madrid. He might beat the corps in his front, but the victory could be of little use beyond the honour of the day, for the eighth and third corps were too near to admit of farther success. The whole operation, was one of time, a political bait to tempt the emperor, whose march from Madrid must be the signal for a retreat that sooner or later was inevitable. To draw Napoleon from the south was the great object, but it behoved the man to be alert that interposed between the lion and his prey.