OBSERVATION 2d.--It follows from this exposition, that Duhesme evinced a surprising want of forethought and military sagacity, in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, with garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. It was this negligence that rendered the timid operations of Swartz and Chabran capital errors; it was this that enabled some poor injured and indignant peasants to kindle a mighty war, and in a very few weeks obliged Napoleon to send thirty thousand men to the relief of Barcelona. [Sidenote: St Cyr.] OBSERVATION 3d.--Duhesme was experienced in battles, and his energy and resources of mind have been praised by a great authority; but undoubtedly an absence of prudent calculation and arrangement, a total neglect of military discipline, marked all his operations in Catalonia; witness his mode of attack on Gerona, the deficiency of ladders, and the confusion of the assaults. Witness also his raising of the second siege, and absolute flight from Caldagues, whose rash enterprise, although crowned with success, should have caused his own destruction. [Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.] [Sidenote: St. Cyr.] [Sidenote: Cabanes.] In those affairs it is certain Duhesme displayed neither talent nor vigour; but in the severities he exercised at the sacking of Mattaro, in the burning of villages, which he executed to the extreme verge of, if not beyond what the harshest laws of war will justify, an odious energy was apparent, and as the ardour of the somatenes was rather increased than repressed by these vigorous proceedings, his conduct may be deemed as impolitic as it was barbarous. OBSERVATION 4th.--In Catalonia all the inherent cruelty of the Spaniards was as grossly displayed as in any other province of Spain. The Catalans were likewise vain and superstitious; but their courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts more sustained; the somatenes were bold and active in battle, the population of the towns firm, and the juntas apparently disinterested. The praise merited and bestowed upon the people of Zaragoza is great; but Gerona more justly claims the admiration of mankind; for the Aragonese troops were by Lefebre driven from the open country in crowds to their capital, and little was wanted to induce them to surrender at once; it was not until the last hour that, gathering courage from despair, the people of Zaragoza put forth all their energy: whereas those of Gerona, although attacked by a greater force, and possessing fewer means of defence, without any internal system of terror to counterbalance their fear of the enemy, manfully and successfully resisted from the first. The people of Zaragoza rallied at their hearthstone; those of Gerona stood firm at the porch. But quitting these matters, I must now, following the order I have marked out, proceed to relate the occurrences in Valencia. OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL MONCEY.