The situation of that city offered great advantages to the Spaniards; the old Moorish walls which surrounded it were complete, and susceptible of being strengthened, so as to require a regular siege; but a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while the army of Gallicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta remained at Benevente; neither could Bessieres, with any prudence, attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente, and while Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri appears to have had some notion of its value, for he commenced forming an entrenched camp in the mountains; but being slain by his soldiers, don Joachim Blake succeeded to the command, and probably fearing a similar fate if the army remained stationary, left one division at Manzanal, and with the remainder marched towards Benevente to unite with Cuesta. [Sidenote: S. Journal of Bessieres’ Operations. MSS.] [Sidenote: Napoleon’s Notes, Appendix, No. 2.] On the French side, marshal Bessieres collected his scattered columns at Palencia; his plan, founded upon instructions from Bayonne, was to make a rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling to his right, to attack and drive the Gallicians back to the mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry, to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving certain reinforcements then preparing for him, to subdue Gallicia, or assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time. [Sidenote: Ibid.]