History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he did not maintain
Estremadura, he did not take Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta
from twice renewing the offensive; yet he remained in an
unhealthy situation until he lost more men, by sickness, than
would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. Two months
so unprofitably wasted by a general, at the head of thirty
thousand good troops, can scarcely be cited. The duke of Belluno’s
reputation has been too hardly earned to attribute this inactivity
to want of talent. That he was averse to aid the operations of
marshal Soult is evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was
so; but, whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, from
indisposition to obey the king, or from a mistaken view of affairs,
I have no means of judging.
CUESTA.
Cuesta’s peculiar unfitness for the lead of an army has been
remarked more than once. It remains to show that his proceedings,
on this occasion, continued to justify those remarks.
1º.--To defend a river, on a long line, is generally hopeless, and
especially when the defenders have not the means of passing freely,
in several places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal,
Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of
others have shown how the passage of rivers may be won. Umenes, who
prevented Antigonus from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the
only example of a general baffling the efforts of a skilful and
enterprising enemy in such an attempt.
2º.--The defence of rivers having always proved fruitless, it
follows that no general should calculate upon success, and that he
should exert the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid
a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept
free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring his magazines
and depôts close up to the army, in such a situation, is rashness
itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim
which forbids the establishment of magazines in the first line of
defence, brought up the whole of his to Deleyton and Truxillo.
His combinations were ill-arranged; he abandoned Mirabete without
an effort, his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy, and his
retreat was confused and eccentric, inasmuch as part of his army
retired into the Guadalupe, while others went to Merida, and he
himself to Medellin.
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