History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
If Soult’s energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his
sagacity and judgement were not less remarkably displayed in what
followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon
Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated,
from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the
bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be
there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat
fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison’s and
Lorge’s corps in the face of an enemy--a circumstance that might
operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly
give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the
generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like
Cintra.
But, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult
destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and
ammunition of Loison’s and Lorge’s divisions; then, leaving the
high road to Braga on his left, and once more taking to the
mountain paths, he made for the heights of Carvalho d’Este, where
he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day’s
march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his
troops in the position he had occupied just two months before at
the battle of Braga; and this spectacle, where twenty thousand men
were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed
so as to produce the greatest effect, roused all the sinking pride
of the French soldiers. It was a happy stroke of generalship, an
inspiration of real genius!
Soult now re-organised his army; taking the command of the
rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to
general Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says
“_the whole army was astonished_;” as if it was not a stroke of
consummate policy that the rear, which was pursued by the British,
should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which
was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a
commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions
of the Portuguese. _Maneta durst not surrender_; and the duke of
Dalmatia dextrously forced those to act with most zeal who were
least inclined to serve him: and, in sooth, such was his perilous
situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of
his character were needed to save the army.
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