The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore, he again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands were complied with, the most important being--1º. The formation of a battering-train;--2º. The concentration of an immense number of detachments, which weakened the active corps;--3º. A reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to join the _corps d’armée_. The first corps should, he said, continue to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, and be prepared either to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle, if that should become necessary. The siege might thus be pressed vigourously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida be next invested, and the communications of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened. The 17th, the king replied, through marshal Jourdan, that he approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult’s demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This drew from the duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:--“_Under present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall recover all our ground._” Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus:--“_I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed._” It is remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says, “_I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large masses_.”