History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July,
that general Venegas, who was under his command, should march
by Trembleque, Ocaña, Puerte Dueños, to Arganda, near Madrid;
where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when the combined
armies should be at Talavera and Escola. This agreement was not
performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had
been foreseen) occurred; viz. that the combined armies were engaged
with the enemy’s concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of
the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta
had countermanded the orders which general Venegas had received
from general Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I
shall make no observation upon this proceeding, excepting that the
plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into
execution, by general Venegas, in this instance.
It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that when I
marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at Talavera. That
agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion,
without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought
not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the
charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that
if general Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made
any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added
thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined
armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was
necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if general
Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I
should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know
the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think
that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.
When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to
observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting
the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the hospital
from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of
August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and
of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance
from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down
our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army,
and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal
of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance
which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of
August, M. de Calvo and don Lozano des Torres being in the town.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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