OBSERVATIONS.--1º. General St. Cyr’s marches were hardy, his battles vigorous and delivered in right time and place; but his campaign, as a whole, may be characterised as one of great efforts without corresponding advantages. He himself attributes this to the condition of the seventh corps, destitute and neglected, because _the emperor disliked and wished to ruin its chief_; a strange accusation, and unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon wilfully destroy his own armies! sacrifice forty thousand men, that a general, who he was not obliged to employ at all, might be disgraced! General St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received his instructions from the emperor, he observed the affliction of the latter at the recent loss of Dupont’s force; yet he would have it believed, that, in the midst of this regret, that monarch, with a singular malice, was preparing greater disasters for himself, merely to disgrace the general commanding the seventh corps, and why? because the latter had formerly served with the army of the Rhine! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and was afterwards made a marshal by this implacable enemy. 2º.--That the seventh corps was not well supplied, and that its commander was thereby placed in a difficult situation, is not to be disputed in the face of the facts stated by general St. Cyr; but if war were a state of ease and smoothness, the fame which attends successful generals would be less. Napoleon selected general St. Cyr because he thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands, he knew the seventh corps would be weak, but, with St. Cyr at its head, he judged it sufficient to overcome the Catalonians; nor was he much mistaken. Barcelona, the great object of solicitude, was saved; Rosas was taken; and if Tarragona and Tortosa did not also fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey, the other after that of Valls, it was because the French general did not choose to attack them. Those towns were without the slightest preparation for defence, moral or physical, and must have surrendered; nor can the unexpected and stubborn resistance of Gerona, Zaragoza, and Valencia be cited against this opinion. The latter cities were previously prepared and expectant of a siege; and yet, in every instance, except Valencia, there was a moment of dismay and confusion, not fatal, only because the besieging generals wanted that ready vigour which is the characteristic of great commanders.