3º.--General St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation of numbers and equipment is but a poor measure of the strength of armies, exalts the enthusiasm and the courage of the Catalans, and seems to tremble at the danger which, owing to Napoleon’s suicidal jealousy, menaced, at that period, not only the seventh corps but even the south of France. In answer to this, it may be observed that M. de St. Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand men having no artillery, and carrying only sixty rounds of musket-ammunition, to plunge into the midst of those terrible armies, to march through the mountains for whole weeks, to attack the strongest positions with the bayonet alone, nay, even to dispense with the use of his artillery, when he did bring it into action, lest his men should not have a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who were these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confident, so regardless of the great weapon of modern warfare? Not the select of the imperial guards, the conquerors in a hundred battles, but raw levies, the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Naples and of Rome, states which to name as military was to ridicule. 4º.--With such soldiers, the battles of Cardadeu, Molino, Igualada, and Valls, were gained; yet general St. Cyr does not hesitate to call the Migueletes, who were beaten at those places, the best light troops in the world. The best _light troops_ are neither more nor less than the best troops in the world; but if, instead of fifteen thousand Migueletes, the four thousand men composing Wellington’s light division had been on the heights of Cardadeu--general St. Cyr’s sixty rounds of ammunition would scarcely have carried him to Barcelona. The injurious force with which personal feelings act upon the judgement are well known, or it might excite wonder that so good a writer and so able a soldier should advance such fallacies.