5º.--General St. Cyr’s work, admirable in many respects, bears, nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness. Thus, he affirms that Dupont’s march to Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjues; but the tumults of Aranjues happened in the month of March, nearly three months previous to Dupont’s movement, which took place in May and June. Again, he says, that, Napoleon, to make a solid conquest in the Peninsula, should have commenced with Catalonia, instead of over-running Spain by the northern line of operations; an opinion quite unsustainable. The progress of the seventh corps was impeded by the want of provisions, not by the enemy’s force. Twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in the field, but they could not subsist. What could three hundred thousand men have done? Would it have given a just idea of Napoleon’s power to employ the strength of his empire against the fortified towns in Catalonia? In what would the greater solidity of this plan have consisted? While the French were thus engaged, the patriots would have been organizing their armies; England would have had time to bring all her troops into line, and two hundred thousand men placed between Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by the western Pyrenees, while the Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would have sorely shaken the solidity of general St. Cyr’s plan. 6º.--The French emperor better understood what he was about; he saw a nation intrinsically powerful and vehemently excited, yet ignorant of war, and wanting the aid which England was eager to give. All the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, and they were fast approximating to a centre, when Napoleon burst upon that country, and as the gathering of a water-spout is said to be sometimes prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and dreadful assault. If the war was not then finished, it was because his lieutenants were tardy and jealous of each other.