Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the personal intrigues of the day: he was, moreover, of too slender a capacity to uphold the dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion; and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped under the hasty touch of sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to every thing that threatened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence, had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own body, to Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for the admission of the troops, but, in reality, to thwart that measure. The circumstance of Mackenzie’s arrival, with an object different from that announced by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England with treachery. For the junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own dupe, believed, or affected to believe, that he was also the dupe of the English minister; and that the whole transaction was an artifice, on the part of the latter, to get possession of the city with a felonious intent. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] The admission of the British troops was nevertheless earnestly desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring towns; and this feeling was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and sir George Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance of the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion; but, at the most critical period of the negotiation, the former was sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of Trieste, and the latter, who was in bad health, dying about the same period, the negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it. General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith, thought that the object might be attained: he observed, indeed, that the people, far from suspecting any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous of the reverses in the north; that nothing had been done towards equipping the fleet for sea; and that, notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of admiral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would neither work themselves nor permit the English sailors to work for them. Still the general feeling was favourable to the British army, and the good wishes of the inhabitants were openly avowed: Mackenzie had, however, only a negative power, the affair being in the hands of Mr. Frere. In the course of the negotiations carried on by that minister, the supreme junta proposed, 1º.--That the troops should land at Port St. Mary’s, and be quartered there and in the neighbouring towns. 2º.--That they should join Cuesta’s army. 3º.--That they should go to Catalonia. 4º.--That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, and attached to the different Spanish armies. Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and pretending to hold the English soldiery cheap, these self-sufficient men proposed that the British should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.]