His views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, than with the wishes of the king, whose poverty, forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army, in person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. But he who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the king’s demands, and thus excited the monarch’s hatred to an incredible degree; nevertheless, the duke of Dalmatia, never lost the emperor’s confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually tranquillized; the military resources of the country drawn forth, and considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully employed, to repress the efforts of the Partisan chiefs. The arsenal of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of lead at Linares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the founderies, and every provision for the use of a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out, a commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada, and finally, a secret, but considerable, traffic carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain. Both marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men in Estremadura, during the months of June and July, would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with fifteen thousand men in the invasion, whenever Tortoza should fall. The application of this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative advances; and whether Napoleon’s recent marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away from business, or that, absorbed by the other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish affairs, or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason, why the king, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal. It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause, than the inevitable errors, that mar all great military combinations not directed by a single hand. CHAPTER VII.