History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The
first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and
Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of
the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by
Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or
the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for
artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land
offers a position where an army could seal the passage on either side
of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position
of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.
On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the
passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and
that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the
savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable
for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by
the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the
positions if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the
Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few,
the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite
impracticable for artillery of any calibre.
Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it
would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the
threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending
army must occupy all the positions on this line of ninety miles,
while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two
marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with
an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier
consists in this, _the Tagus along its whole course is, from June
to December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the
lines_. A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at
any place below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the frontier
positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of
the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria,
and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in
the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the
Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons _the frontier of
Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers_.
Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of
the French corps, led lord Wellington to expect, that the principal
attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while
an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco
upon Abrantes, and, under this impression, he made the following
dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniché,
Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were
garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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