History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, lord
Wellington trusted that his own military quickness, and the valour
of the British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes during
the retreat, and once within the Lines, (the Portuguese people
and the government doing their part) he looked confidently to the
final result. He judged that, in a wasted country, and with thirty
regiments of militia, in the mountains on the flank and rear of the
enemy, the latter could not long remain before the Lines, and his
retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were
however many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident
as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be
expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest
with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at
their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a
third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand
tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the
British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity
for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens
as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army.
In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source
of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have
supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies;
there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country
but it was unevenly distributed; some places were exhausted, others
overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in
this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass
unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards first
to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal
there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the
people, and after a time scarcely any food for man or beast, (some
cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted,) was to be
obtained in that country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a
manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships
and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable
war, and even thus, it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle
against famine, while near the sea, but at a distance from that
nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated
the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in
Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use; hence the
only resource, for the conveyance of stores, was water-carriage, to a
certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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