History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes
of using them. 1º. In an open advance and battle. 2º. In a secret
movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have
assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single
bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view of capturing the battering
train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without
dwelling on the fact that Massena’s information was so good that he
knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana’s visit,
such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the
early part of the siege, and, certainly, not towards the end, when
the enemy were on the Azava.
An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing
over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers,
must have exposed its flanks to the enemy’s bridges on the Agueda,
because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of
the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope then
for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers,
when eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns should come pouring over
the bridges on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry followed
to the attack? What would even a momentary success avail? Five
thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would
have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the
battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a
poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual
state of affairs in that country?--The militia deserting in crowds
to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the general, the
measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public
mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and
advanced to retrieve his honour, and who was to have withstood him?
Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired
that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared
careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, that
he was afraid!--that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared
to carry him away--that he was a man, who, insensible to military
honour, permitted his ally’s towns to fall without risking a shot
to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety
failed; lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. “If
thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a
great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!”
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