History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful,
that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still
contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing
winter, and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to
attempt a removal of their property.
Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders
on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated.
But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of
moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had
to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent
commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable
multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to
save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in
the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame
the people’s minds; and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was
discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion
to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general
officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to
fight, although Massena had above sixty thousand veterans, and lord
Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more
than half of which were untried soldiers.
The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated
by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain
every thing by a victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and
the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent
it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him
to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting
himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the
northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable
him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by
the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French
could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general’s
resources could not be much improved, and it was very doubtful if
either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some
palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense.
Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right
bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon
their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the
first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of
the great road from Oporto; the light division at Mortagao watching
the road from Viseu, and the remainder of the army in reserve ready
to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had
repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, lord
Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de
Busaco for his position of battle.
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