On the other hand, the French general’s situation was becoming very perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a moveable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For sometime he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet that general relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain was by no means relinquished. Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena’s obstinacy gave way; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution; yet adopted at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal, by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena’s failure; this can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled twenty thousand men on Soult’s rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese regulars, besides ordenança; while the infinite number of boats at lord Wellington’s command would have enabled him to throw troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now, if the latter had been defeated; with what argument could he have defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank and rear; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of Barosa.