History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Massena had now regained his original base of operations, and his
retreat may be said to have terminated; but he was far from wishing
to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general,
and shorn of half his authority; because Bessieres commanded the
northern provinces, which, at the commencement of the invasion,
had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal,
and that his previous retreat might appear as a mere change of
position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other
incumbrances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda,
make a countermarch, through Sabugal and Pena Macor, to the Elga;
establishing a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and by the
valley of the Tagus with the king.
[Sidenote: General Pelet’s Notes. See Vol. xxi. Victoires et
Conquêtes des Français.]
But now the factions in his army had risen to such a height that he
could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants; Montbrun,
Junot, Drouet, Reynier, and Ney were all at variance with each other
and with him. The first had, in the beginning of the retreat, been
requested to secure Coimbra; instead of which he quitted Portugal,
carrying with him Claparede’s division; Marcognet’s brigade was then
ordered for that operation, but it did not move; finally, Montbrun
undertook it, and failed in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by
his wound, but his faction did not the less shew their discontent.
Reynier’s dislike to the prince was so strong, that the officers
carrying flags of truce, from his corps, never failed to speak of it
to the British; and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied his
authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, the tardiness of
Marcognet’s brigade, and, finally, the too-sudden evacuation of the
position at Condeixa, have been attributed: and it is alleged that,
far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the
signal for a preconcerted retreat, that he had promised Massena to
maintain the position for twenty-four hours longer. The personal
risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position,
would seem to confirm this; but it is certain that, when Picton was
observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the
French, and by which the second corps could have been separated from
the army, and the passes of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have
been frantic to have delayed his movement.
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