History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
With respect to the first, lord Wellington had made strenuous
efforts, and his advice, and remonstrances, had at times saved the
armies in the field from destruction; some partial attempts were also
made to form troops under British officers in the Spanish service,
but to a system like that which England exercised in Portugal, the
leading Spaniards would never listen. This was one result of Mr.
Canning’s impolitic fostering of the Spanish pride, for it was by
no means apparent that the people would have objected to such an
arrangement, if it had been prudently urged, before the republican
party in the cortes, and the popular press, had filled their minds
with alarm upon the subject. The Catalans openly and repeatedly
desired to have an English general, and in 1812 colonel Green did
organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in
the Balearic isles large divisions; colonel Cox had before proposed
a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by lord Wellington,
and I have been unable to trace any important service rendered by
those officers with their divisions. Their reputation was however
quite eclipsed by one Downie, who had passed from the British
commissariat into the Spanish service, and the English ministers,
taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and
equipments for a body of cavalry, called the Estremadura Legion, of
such an expensive and absurd nature, as to induce a general officer
to exclaim on seeing them that “he blushed for the folly of his
government.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.]
When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the
Spanish regulars, they endeavoured to prop the war by the irregulars.
But the increase of this force, which however never exceeded thirty
thousand men in arms, gave offence to the regular officers, and
amidst these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and
quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all
confidence in their generals. The latter, as in the case of Freire
with the Murcian army, generally expected to be beaten in every
action, and cared very little about it, because the regency were sure
to affirm that they were victorious; and another of those wandering
starved naked bands, which they called armies, could be formed from
new levies in a month.
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