History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Mr. Villiers’s mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning,
had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in
business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he
found every thing, except the army under Beresford, in a state of
disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing, because
of the vacillating system hitherto pursued by the British government.
As early as 1808 lord Wellington had advised the ministers not only
to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to
assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw
forth all its resources, both of men and money, and to make up any
deficiency, by the power of England. This advice had been neglected,
and an entirely different policy pursued, which, in execution, was
also feeble and uncertain.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
The Portuguese constitution, like most of those springing from
the feudal system, was excellent in theory, as far as regarded
the defence of the kingdom: but it was overwhelmed with abuses in
practice; and it was a favourite maxim with the authorities that
it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect in the
subordinates. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men
to be oppressed, there was no want of vigour or of severity; but in
all that regarded the administration of affairs, it was considered
sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and
no animadversion, much less punishment, followed disobedience.
The character of the government was extreme weakness; the taxes,
partially levied, produced only half their just amount; the payments
from the treasury were in arrears; the army was neglected in all
things dependent on the civil administration, and a bad navy was
kept up, at an expense of a quarter of a million, to meet a war with
Algiers. This last question was, however, a knife with a double edge,
for in peace, a tribute paid in coin, drained the treasury already
too empty, and in war the fleet did nothing; meanwhile the feeding
of Cadiz was rendered precarious by it; and of Lisbon also, for the
whole produce of Portugal was only equal to four months’ consumption.
In commercial affairs, the usual peninsular jealousy was displayed;
the imports of British goods were prohibited to the advantage of
smugglers only, while the government which thus neglected its own
resources to the injury of both countries, clamoured for subsidies.
Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great, and the regency was
so entirely subservient to them, that although Mr. Stuart had been
assured by Mr. Canning, that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to
meddle with affairs at Lisbon, had been procured from the Brazils,
all representations, to the regency, were met by references to that
nobleman, who was in London, and the business of the mission was thus
paralysed.
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