History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Whether Napoleon really meant this; or whether he only spread the
report, with a view to restrain the allies from any offensive
operations during the summer, and to mislead the English cabinet
as to the real state of his negotiations with Russia, intending if
the latter proved favourable to turn his whole force against the
Peninsula, does not very clearly appear; yet it is certain that every
thing in Spain at this time indicated his approach. Lord Wellington’s
opinion that the emperor was bound to drive the British army away or
lose his influence in the world does not however seem quite just;
because the mighty expedition to Moscow, proved, that Napoleon did
not want force to conquer Spain; and success in Russia would have
enabled him to prolong the war in the Peninsula as a drain on the
English resources for many years; which was so obvious a policy,
that the rest of Europe could not from thence draw conclusions
unfavourable to his influence.
[Sidenote: Colonel Jones’s History of the Peninsular War.]
Under the notion that Napoleon’s coming was probable, the English
general, with characteristic prudence, turned his own attention to
the security of his ancient refuge within the lines, and therefore
urgently desired the government to put the fortresses in order,
repair the roads, and restore the bridges broken during Massena’s
invasion. An increased number of workmen were also put to the lines,
for the engineers had never ceased to improve those on the northern
bank of the Tagus, and on the southern bank the double lines of
Almada had been continued on a gigantic scale. The defensive canal
there was planned to float ships of three hundred tons, and to serve
as a passage from the Tagus to Setuval by joining the navigation of
the Sadao and Marateca rivers; thus conducing to objects of general
utility as well as the military defence; as it will be found that
lord Wellington did at all times sustain, not only the political,
and financial, and military affairs, but also the agricultural, the
commercial, and charitable interests of Portugal. The batteries at
the mouth of the Tagus were likewise put into complete order, they
were provided with furnaces for heating shot, and captain Holloway
of the engineers, at a trifling expense, constructed four jetties at
St. Julian’s, in such an ingenious manner, that they withstood the
most tempestuous gales and secured the embarkation of the army in
any season. Finally the militia were again called out, a measure of
greater import, in the actual state of affairs, than would at first
appear; for the expense was a very heavy drain upon the finances, and
the number of hands thus taken away from agriculture was a serious
evil.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s correspondence with Lord Liverpool, MSS.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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