History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 4
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
In this dilemma lord Wellington adopted, from necessity, a very
unmilitary and dangerous remedy. For having declared to the members
of the Portuguese government, that on their heads he would throw
the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas, if they did not
immediately victual both, a threat which had its due effect, he
employed the whole of the carriages and mules attached to the army to
bring up stores to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; meanwhile he quartered
his troops near the points of water-carriage, that is to say, on the
Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus. Thus the army was spread from the
Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to
the Mondego, on a line little less than four hundred miles long, and
in the face of three hostile armies, the farthest of which was but
a few marches from the outposts. It was however scarcely possible
for the French to assemble again in masses, before the ripening of
the coming harvest; and on the other hand, even the above measure
was insufficient to gain time; the expedition against Andalusia was
therefore abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated.
CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
[Sidenote: 1812.]
In this campaign the French forces were too much scattered, and they
occupied the countries bordering on Portugal rather as a conquered
territory than as a field of operations. The movements of the armies
of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have been so
combined as to present a hundred thousand men on a field of battle;
yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it
were of them all, and was never disturbed by the approach of even
thirty thousand men. This arose partly from want of union, partly
from the orders of the Emperor, whose plans the generals either did
not or would not understand in their true spirit, and therefore
executed without vigour; and yet the French writers have generally
endeavoured to fasten the failures on Napoleon, as if he only was
mistaken about the war in Spain! It is easy to spurn the dead lion!
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