History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Such, then, was the nature of Napoleon’s power that success alone
could sustain it; success which depended as much upon others’
exertions as upon his own stupendous genius, for Russia was far
distant from Spain. It is said, I know not upon what authority, that
he at one moment, had resolved to concentrate all the French troops
in the Peninsula behind the Ebro during this expedition to Russia,
but the capture of Blake’s force at Valencia changed his views. Of
this design there are no traces in the movements of his armies, nor
in the captured papers of the king, and there are some indications
of a contrary design; for at that period several foreign agents were
detected examining the lines of Torres Vedras, and on a Frenchman,
who killed himself when arrested in the Brazils, were found papers
proving a mission for the same object. Neither is it easy to discern
the advantage of thus crowding three hundred thousand men on a narrow
slip of ground, where they must have been fed from France, already
overburthened with the expenses of the Russian war; and this when
they were numerous enough, if rightly handled, to have maintained
themselves on the resources of Spain, and near the Portuguese
frontier for a year at least.
To have given up all the Peninsula, west of the Ebro, would have
been productive of no benefit, save what might have accrued from
the jealousy which the Spaniards already displayed towards their
allies; but if that jealousy, as was probable, had forced the British
general away, he could have carried his army to Italy, or have formed
in Germany the nucleus of a great northern confederation on the
emperor’s rear. Portugal was therefore, in truth, the point of all
Europe in which the British strength was least dangerous to Napoleon
during the invasion of Russia; moreover, an immediate war with that
empire was not a certain event previous to the capture of Valencia.
Napoleon was undoubtedly anxious to avoid it while the Spanish
contest continued; yet, with a far-reaching European policy, in which
his English adversaries were deficient, he foresaw and desired to
check the growing strength of that fearful and wicked power which now
menaces the civilised world.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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