To govern armies in the field, is at all times a great and difficult matter; and in this contest the operations were so intimately connected with the civil administration of Portugal, Spain, and the Brazils, and the contest, being one of principles, so affected the policy of every nation of the civilised world, that unprecedented difficulties sprung up in the way of the general, and the ordinary frauds and embarrassments of war were greatly augmented. Napoleon’s continental system joined to his financial measures, which were quite opposed to debt and paper money, increased the pernicious effects of the English bank restriction; specie was abundant in France, but had nearly disappeared from England; it was only to be obtained from abroad, and at an incredible expense. The few markets left for British manufactures, and colonial produce, did not always make returns in the articles necessary for the war, and gold, absolutely indispensable in certain quantities, was only supplied, and this entirely from the incapacity of the English ministers, in the proportion of one-sixth of what was required, by an army which professed to pay for every thing. Hence continual efforts, on the part of the government, to force markets, hence a depreciation of value both in goods and bills; hence also a continual struggle, on the part of the general, to sustain a contest, dependant on the fluctuation of such a precarious system. Dependant also it was upon the prudence of three governments, one of which had just pushed its colonies to rebellion, when the French armies were in possession of four-fifths of the mother country; another was hourly raising up obstacles to its own defence though the enemy had just been driven from the capital; and the third was forcing a war with America, its greatest and surest market, when by commerce alone it could hope to sustain the struggle in the Peninsula.