The French misfortunes, he said, had invariably arisen from not acting in large masses, and the army of Portugal, by spreading too much to its right, would ruin this campaign as it had ruined the preceding one. “Marmont should leave one or two divisions on the Tormes, and place the rest of his army in position, on both sides of the pass of Baños, the left near Placentia, and the right, extending towards Somosierra, which could be occupied by a detachment. Lord Wellington could not then advance by the valley of the Tagus without lending his left flank; nor to the Tormes without lending his right flank. Neither could he attack Marmont with effect, because the latter could easily concentrate, and according to the nature of the attack secure his retreat by the valley of the Tagus, or by the province of Avila, while the two divisions on the Tormes reinforced by two others from the army of the north would act on the allies’ flank.” For these reasons Soult would not permit Drouet to quit Estremadura, yet he promised to reinforce him and so to press Hill, that Graham whom he supposed still at Portalegre, should be obliged to bring up the first and sixth divisions. In fine he promised that a powerful body of the allies should be forced to remain in Estremadura, or Hill would be defeated and Badajos invested. This dispute raged during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile the English general well acquainted from the intercepted letters with these dissensions, made his arrangements, so as to confirm each general in his own peculiar views. Soult was the more easily deceived, because he had obtained a Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent was the Portuguese government, lord Wellington’s secret despatches to Forjas containing an account of his army and of his first designs against the south were printed, and it must be remembered that the plan of invading Andalusia was only relinquished about the middle of May. Hill’s exploit at Almaraz menaced the north and south alike, but that general had adroitly spread a report, that his object was to gain time for the invasion of Andalusia, and all Wellington’s demonstrations were calculated to aid this artifice and impose upon Soult. Graham indeed returned to Beira with the first and sixth divisions and Cotton’s cavalry; but as Hill was at the same time reinforced, and Graham’s march sudden and secret, the enemy were again deceived in all quarters. For Marmont and the king, reckoning the number of divisions, thought the bulk of the allies was in the north, and did not discover that Hill’s corps had been nearly doubled in numbers though his division seemed the same, while Soult not immediately aware of Graham’s departure, found Hill more than a match for Drouet, and still expected the allies in Andalusia.