History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The series of beautiful movements executed by Clauzel, merit every
praise, but it may be questioned if the English general’s marches
were in the true direction, or made in good time; for though
Clinton’s retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely
dictate the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clauzel’s
advance to Valladolid; it was therefore no surprise, and on the
26th of August, Foy was still at Zamora. At that period the English
general might have had his army, Clinton’s troops excepted, at
Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid, is rather
less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former,
Clinton advancing at the same time, might have separated Clauzel from
Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de
Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by Valladolid; he might
also have brought forward the third, or the light division, by the
Somosierra, from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to
close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys
of the Pisuerga and the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda, or Lerma,
have fallen upon Clauzel while in march. That general having Clinton
and the Gallicians on his rear, and Wellington, reinforced by the
divisions from Madrid, on his front or flank, would then have had to
fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine the object
was to crush Clauzel, and this should have been effected though
Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is however
probable that want of money and means of transport decided the line
of operations, for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren,
and the feeding of the troops even by Valladolid was from hand to
mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal.
SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.
[Sidenote: Colonel Jones’s Sieges, 2nd edit.]
Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides
artillery-men, in this place, and general Dubreton the governor, was
of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his
sanguine and warlike countryman. The castle and its works enclosed
a rugged hill, between which and the river, the city of Burgos was
situated. An old wall with a new parapet and flanks constructed
by the French offered the first line of defence; the second line,
which was within the other, was earthen, of the nature of a field
retrenchment and well palisaded; the third line was similarly
constructed and contained the two most elevated points of the hill,
on one of which was an entrenched building called the White Church,
and on the other the ancient keep of the castle; this last was the
highest point, and was not only entrenched but surmounted with a
heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery. Thus there were
five separate enclosures.
[Sidenote: See Plan 4.]
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