Lord Wellington was greatly displeased that this false alarm, given by Erskine, should have rendered the success incomplete; yet he avoided any public expression of discontent, lest the enemy, who had no apparent interest in preserving the post of Mirabete, should be led to keep it, and so embarrass the allies when their operations required a restoration of the bridge of Almaraz. To the ministers however he complained, that his generals, stout in action, personally, as the poorest soldiers, were commonly so overwhelmed with the fear of responsibility when left to themselves, that the slightest movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment, and they spread unnecessary alarm far and wide. But instead of expressing his surprise, he should rather have reflected on the cause of this weakness. Every British officer of rank knew, that without powerful interest, his future prospects, and his reputation for past services, would have withered together under the first blight of misfortune; that a selfish government would instantly offer him up, a victim to a misjudging public and a ribald press with whom success is the only criterion of merit. English generals are and must be prodigal of their blood to gain a reputation, but they are necessarily timid in command, when a single failure, even without a fault, consigns them to an old age of shame and misery. It is however undeniable that sir William Erskine was not an able officer. On the other side the king was equally discontented with Soult, whose refusal to reinforce Drouet, he thought had caused the loss of Almaraz, and he affirmed that if Hill had been more enterprising, the arsenal of Madrid might have fallen as well as the dépôt of Almaraz, for he thought that general had brought up his whole corps instead of a division only six thousand strong. CHAPTER II. [Sidenote: 1812. April.] While the Anglo-British army was thus cleansing and strengthening its position on the frontier of Portugal, the progress of the war in other parts had not been so favourable to the common cause. It has already been shewn that Gallicia, in the latter part of 1811, suffered from discord, poverty, and ill success in the field; that an extraordinary contribution imposed upon the province, had been resisted by all classes, and especially at Coruña the seat of Government; finally that the army torn by faction was become hateful to the people. In this state of affairs Castaños having, at the desire of lord Wellington, assumed the command, removed the seat of Government to St. Jago, leaving the troops in the Bierzo under the marquis of Portazgo.