Pampeluna was strong. A regular attack required three weeks for the bringing up of ordnance and stores, five or six weeks more for the attack, and from fifteen to twenty thousand of the best men, because British soldiers were wanted for the assault; but an investment could be maintained by fewer and inferior troops, Spaniards and Portuguese, and the enemy’s magazines were likely to fail under blockade sooner than his ramparts would crumble under fire. Moreover on the eastern coast misfortune and disgrace had befallen the English arms. Sir John Murray had failed at Taragona. He had lost the honoured battering-train intrusted to his charge, and his artillery equipage was supposed to be ruined. The French fortresses in Catalonia and Valencia were numerous, the Anglo-Sicilian army could neither undertake an important siege, nor seriously menace the enemy without obtaining some strong place as a base. Suchet was therefore free to march on Zaragoza, and uniting with Clauzel and Paris, to operate with a powerful mass against the right flank of the allies. For these reasons Wellington finally concluded to blockade Pampeluna and besiege San Sebastian, and the troops, as they returned from the pursuit of Clauzel, marched to form a covering army in the mountains. The peasantry of the vicinity were then employed on the works of the blockade which was ultimately intrusted to O’Donnel’s Andalusian reserve. Confidently did the English general expect the immediate fall of San Sebastian, and he was intent to have it before the negociations for the armistice in Germany should terminate; but mighty pains and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be treated of, the progress of the war in other parts, during his victorious march from Portugal to the Pyrenees, must be treated of. CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN COAST. [Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 512.] It will be remembered that the duke Del Parque was to move from the Sierra Morena, by Almanza, to join Elio, whose army had been reinforced from Minorca; the united troops were then to act against Suchet, on the Xucar, while sir John Murray sailed to attack Taragona. Del Parque received his orders the 24th of April, he had long known of the project and the march was one of twelve days, yet he did not reach his destination until the end of May. This delay resulted, partly from the bad state of his army, partly from the usual procrastination of Spaniards, partly from the conduct of Elio, whose proceedings, though probably springing from a dislike to serve under Del Parque, created doubts of his own fidelity. [Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 460.]